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Abstract
This note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality
averse and anonymous, if one is more inequality averse than the other, it
induces a more risk averse household through optimal sharing than the other.
We present examples showing that this comparative static can be reversed if
either the property of inequality aversion or anonymity is dropped.
1. Introduction
The result in this note studies the interconnection between inequality aversion, on the one
hand, and risk aversion, on the other. A common observation is that inequality aversion
and risk aversion often go hand-in-hand. For instance, a risk averse decision maker
choosing among income distributions (not knowing in which part of the distribution he
will reside) is indistinguishable from an inequality averse social planner.
In this work, we tackle the interplay between inequality aversion and risk aversion
from a different perspective. A household of individuals shares risk in order to optimize
some social welfare function; the individuals may differ in terms of their risk attitudes,
but hold common beliefs. The risk comes in aggregate form and must be distributed
amongst the agents. We follow Samuelson (1956) and Chipman and Moore (1979) in
studying household behavior under various social welfare functions. Social welfare func-
tions can be ranked according to their propensity to reduce inequality. A simple intuition
would suggest that the more inequality averse a social welfare function, the more it must
reflect all agents preferences. The more it reflects all individuals preferences, in par-
ticular, the more it reflects the “weakest” or most risk-averse individual’s preferences.
Less inequality averse social welfare functions would not seem to have this property–
maximizing aggregate utility for example would always allocate risk to the agents who
benefit the most from it; these are the least risk averse agents. Using this naive intuition,
we could conclude that more inequality averse households would tend to be more risk
averse.
∗This note grew out of discussions with Federico Echenique and Mark Machina, toward whom I am
grateful.
This intuition turns out to be true up to a point, and this is our main result. This
simple comparative static holds for a broad family of social choice rules: namely, those
which are anonymous (social utility depends only on the distribution of utilities) and
inequality averse in an absolute sense: reducing inequality always benefits society. A
plethora of rules exhibit these two properties; indeed, any social welfare function which
is symmetric and quasiconcave has them. For this family of rules, a more inequality
averse social welfare function induces a more risk averse household preference.
However, this intuition breaks down upon removing one of the two properties. It
turns out the critical feature of anonymous and inequality averse social welfare functions
is that equal division is always a socially optimal allocation of a certain dollar. Equal
division of a dollar always results in equal utilities. For an aggregate risky prospect to be
preferred to a certain dollar, it must therefore be the case that there is an allocation of
that risky prospect which is socially better than equal division of that dollar. And if this
is true for a social welfare function, it is certainly also true for a less inequality averse
social welfare function.
When dropping either of the two properties, however, equal division of a certain dollar
need not be socially optimal. In general then a comparison of the induced preferences
given two social welfare functions ranked in terms of inequality aversion need not exist.
The key feature of an equal division of a dollar is that it results in an equal distribution
of utilities: the property of inequality aversion is about how a list of utilities compares
to equal division. Without the equal division benchmark, it turns out that anything can
happen.
Section 2 illustrates the issues involved with a simple example. Section 3 provides the
main result of the paper. Section 4 provides examples illustrating how the conclusion of
the theorem can break down when assumptions are dropped. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Three social welfare functions
There are two individuals living in a household, Alice and Bob. The household faces
aggregate uncertainty about a monetary payoff, which depends on the state of nature,
Rain or Shine (R or S). Each individual has a quasiconcave utility function, which
is homogeneous of degree one, over risky consumption. For example, Alice’s utility for
(xR, xS) is UA (xR, xS). Utilities are further assumed to be measured in dollars, so that for
a constant consumption bundle (c, c), Ui (c, c) = c. Lastly, the utilities have a common
prior (piR, piS), which is simply a vector for which for all certain consumption (c, c),
Ui (xR, xS) ≥ c implies piRxR + piSxS ≥ c.
The normalization of utility reflects the fact that utility is measured in dollar
amounts–the utility of risky consumption is equal to its certainty equivalent. This facil-
itates comparison of utilities across agents (money is a natural metric).
Alice and Bob must decide how to rank aggregate consumption. They decide to
allocate aggregate consumption according to a social choice rule. The social choice rule
maps individual utilities into an aggregate utility: W : R2+ → R. The specification of
this choice rule determines the ranking over aggregate consumption. Three social choice
rules, which take as input utility, are as follows:
i) The maximax rule:
Wmax (u1, u2) = max {u1, u2}
ii) The utilitarian rule:
WU (u1, u2) = u1 + u2
and
iii) The maximin (Rawlsian) rule
Wmin (u1, u2) = min {u1, u2} .
The three rules differ as to their inequality aversion. The maximax rule is, in a
sense, inequality loving, while the utilitarian is inequality neutral, and the maximin is
inequality averse. We ask how the behavior of the rules in terms of inequality aversion
affects the household’s behavior in terms of risk aversion. A simple intuition is that,
the more inequality averse the social welfare function, the more risk averse the induced
household preference. We show that this intuition breaks down in a strong way in this
example.
The household’s utility of an aggregate bundle (xR, xS) is given by
max
xAR+x
B
R=xR
xAS+x
B
S=xS
W
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A
S
)
, UB
(
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B
S
))
.
The household utility therefore depends on the social welfare function under considera-
tion. We can ask how these household utilities fare as to risk aversion. One way to verify
this, using a classical characterization of risk aversion, is to compute the at least as good
as sets for a constant aggregate bundle (c, c) (these are the set of aggregate bundles that
the household ranks at least as good as a sure thing paying out c).
Denote the individual at least as good as sets for (c, c) for i = A,B by
U
i
(c, c) = {(xR, xS) : Ui (xR, xS) ≥ Ui (c, c) = c} .
It is a straightforward exercise to compute the at least as good as sets for the household,
given each of the social choice rules introduced above. For the maximax rule, the at
least as good as set for (c, c) is
U
max
(c, c) = U
A
(c, c) ∪ UB (c, c) .
For the utilitarian rule, it is
U
U
(c, c) = co
(
U
A
(c, c) ∪ UB (c, c)
)
.
For the maximin rule, it is
U
min
(c, c) =
1
2
U
A
(c, c) +
1
2
U
B
(c, c) .
Therefore, for this example, U
max
(c, c) ⊂ UU (c, c) and Umin (c, c) ⊂ UU (c, c), with strict
inclusions (in general). In general there is no relation between U
max
(c, c) and U
min
(c, c).
These two set inclusions demonstrate that the utilitarian social welfare function leads
to a less risk averse household than either the maximax or the maximin planner. This
coincides with our intuition for the maximin case, but not for the maximax case.
3. The explanation
The intuition that greater inequality aversion leads to greater risk aversion turns out to
be true, but only with some caveats. The comparative static does not hold for all pairs
of social welfare functions. First, note that, in the example, while the maximax social
welfare function is less inequality averse than the utilitarian social welfare function, it is
not, in an absolute sense, inequality averse. This fact turns out be responsible for the
breakdown in our intuition.
Secondly, note that all three social welfare functions in the example are anonymous;
that is, W (uA, uB) = W (uB, uA). Social welfare functions violating this property will
also falsify the comparative static in general.
Let us let N = {1, ..., n} denote a finite household of agents, and Ω = {1, ..., ω} a
finite set of states. Each individual has a utility function Ui : RΩ+ → R which is increasing,
continuous, and quasiconcave; we further assume as in the example that utility functions
are normalized so that for any constant bundle (c, c, ..., c), Ui (c, ..., c) = c. As in the
example, this is a natural metric for comparing utility across agents. We lastly assume,
as in the example, that there is a common prior (pi1, ..., piω) for which for all c,
Ui (x1, ..., xω) ≥ c =⇒
ω∑
s=1
pisxs ≥ c.
A social welfare function W : RN+ → R is inequality averse if it is quasiconcave; it
is anonymous if for any relabelling of the names of agents, the social utility does not
change. We assume all social welfare functions are monotonic and continuous. For two
social welfare functions W,W ′, we will say that W is more inequality averse than W ′ if
for any (u1, ..., un) and (v, v, ..., v),
W (u1, ..., un) ≥ W (v, ..., v) =⇒ W ′ (u1, ..., un) ≥ W ′ (v, ..., v) .
That is, any deviation from equality of utility which W finds acceptable, W ′ finds ac-
ceptable as well.1
The social welfare function generates a household utility function, given by
UW (x1, ..., xω) = max∑n
i=1 x
i
s=xs
W
(
U1
(
x11, ..., x
1
ω
)
, ..., Un (x
n
1 , ..., x
n
ω)
)
.
That is, the household utility is the maximal social utility that can be achieved with an
aggregate bundle.
We now say that household utility UW is more risk averse than household utility UW ′
if for any constant aggregate bundle (c, c, ..., c) and any (x1, ..., xω),
UW (x1, ..., xω) ≥ UW (c, c, ..., c) =⇒ UW ′ (x1, ..., xω) ≥ UW ′ (c, c, ..., c) .
That is, any deviation from uncertainty which UW finds acceptable, UW ′ also finds ac-
ceptable.2 Note the parallel with the comparative notion of inequality aversion. This
parallel is only superficial: with inequality aversion, W ranks N -vectors, whereas with
risk aversion, UW ranks Ω-vectors.
This brings us to the main result:
Theorem 1 Suppose that W and W ′ are anonymous and inequality averse social welfare
functions. Then if W is more inequality averse than W ′, UW is more risk averse than
UW ′.
The proof of the theorem is extremely simple and is illustrated in Figure 1. A critical
step in the proof shows that for any constant bundle (c, ..., c), the utility possibility set
is a simplex. Denote the utility possibility set of (x1, ..., xω) by U (x). Supposing that
UW (x1, ..., xω) ≥ UW (c, ..., c) means there is a point on U (x) which W ranks as at least
as high as every point on the c-simplex. But as the maximizers of W and W ′ on this c-
simplex coincide and are equal to the ray of equal coordinates, sinceW is more inequality
averse than W ′, the relevant upper contour set of W is contained in the upper contour
set of W ′. Therefore, there is a point on U (x) which W ′ ranks at least as high as every
point on the c-simplex.
Proof : Let (c, c, ..., c) ∈ RΩ+. We claim that for both W and W ′, a maximizer to the
function
maxW
(
U1
(
x11, ..., x
1
ω
)
, ..., Un (x
n
1 , ..., x
n
ω)
)
subject to
∑n
i=1 x
i
s = c is given by x
i
s =
c
n
for all i ∈ N , s ∈ Ω. To see this, note that
all allocations {(x11, ..., x1ω) , ..., (xn1 , ..., xnω)} of (c, c, ..., c) are weakly Pareto dominated by
1The comparative notion of inequality aversion is essentially due to Atkinson (1970). It parallels the
comparative notion of risk aversion pioneered by Yaari (1969).
2As noted, this general comparative notion of risk aversion is due to Yaari (1969).
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Figure 1: Proof of main result
an allocation for which for all i ∈ N and all s, s′, xis = xis′ (that is; the allocation is
independent of the state, featuring no uncertainty). As pi is a prior,
Ui
(
xi1, ..., x
i
ω
) ≤ (pi1, ..., piω) · (xi1, ..., xiω) .
Consequently
n∑
i=1
Ui
(
xi1, ..., x
i
ω
) ≤ n∑
i=1
(pi1, ..., piω) ·
(
xi1, ..., x
i
ω
)
= (pi1, ..., piω) · (c, ..., c)
= c.
Now, let {(d1, ..., d1) , ..., (dn, ..., dn)} be an allocation of c such that for all i ∈ N ,
Ui
(
xi1, ..., x
i
ω
) ≤ di.
As for any constant allocations {(d1, ..., d1) , ..., (dn, ..., dn)} of c, Ui (di, ..., di) = di, as
both W and W ′ are monotonic, it follows that they have maximizers on{(
d1, ..., dn
)
:
n∑
i=1
di = c
}
.
As they are anonymous and quasiconcave,
(
c
n
, ..., c
n
)
maximizes each of them; these
utilities are given by the allocation
{(
c
n
, ..., c
n
)
, ...,
(
c
n
, ..., c
n
)}
. Now, suppose that
UW (x1, ..., xω) ≥ UW (c, ..., c). Let {(x11, ..., x1ω) , ..., (xn1 , ..., xnω)} solve
max∑n
i=1 x
i
s=xs
W
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)
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n
ω)
)
.
Then
W
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c
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)
.
Consequently, as W is more inequality averse than W ′,
W ′
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1
ω
)
, ..., Un (x
n
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.
Therefore,
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Consequently UW ′ (x1, ..., xω) ≥ UW ′ (c, ..., c).
4. Examples
Recall the example in Section 2. There, the maximax rule induced a more risk averse
household utility than the utilitarian rule. The maximax rule is less inequality averse
than the utilitarian rule; yet they are both anonymous. The reason for the violation of
the theorem is that the maximax rule is itself not absolutely inequality averse.
The result also fails badly if the social choice functions under consideration are not
anonymous. Again, consider two agents Alice and Bob. To discuss this example, we need
not discuss the underlying states or preferences of the agents. Consider the two social
welfare functions W (u1, u2) = inf
{
u1 + 3u2,
7
5
(u1 + 2u2)
}
and W ′ (u1, u2) = u1 + 3u2.
Note that W is more inequality averse than W ′. We claim that, in general, W leads to a
less risk averse household utility than W ′. To see why, fix some aggregate (x1, x2). The
utility possibility set for this aggregate bundle is given by
U (x1, x2) =
{(
U1
(
x11, x
1
2
)
, U2
(
x21, x
2
2
))
: x11 + x
2
1 = x1, x
1
2 + x
2
2 = x2
}
.
With this notation, UW (x1, x2) = max(u1,u2)∈U(x1,x2)W (u1, u2). Now, suppose that
UW ′ (x1, x2) ≥ UW ′ (c, c). Recall that U (c, c) = {(d, e) : d+ e = c}. Note that the
maximizer of W ′ and of W on U (c, c) is (0, c). Therefore, UW ′ (x1, x2) ≥ UW ′ (c, c)
implies that max(u1,u2)∈U(x1,x2) u1+3u2 ≥ 3c. But note that UW (c, c) = 145 c; consequently,
as u1 + 3u2 ≥ 3c implies both 75 (u1 + 2u2) ≥ 145 c and u1 + 3u2 ≥ 145 c, we conclude
max(u1,u2)∈U(x1,x2) inf
{
u1 + 3u2,
7
5
(u1 + 2u2)
} ≥ 14
5
c, so that UW (x1, x2) ≥ UW (c, c).
W W ′
c
Figure 2: Non anonymous social welfare functions
Figure 2 illustrates the example. Each of W and W ′ are maximized on the c-simplex
at the same point. The level sets of W and W ′ are each homothetic expansions of the
level sets depicted. Note that, at the ray of equal coordinates, the at least as good as set
of W is always properly contained in that of W ′; but at the point (0, c), the opposite is
true. Therefore, UW ′ is more risk averse than UW .
5. Conclusion
The results of this note indicate that oftentimes, a household whose allocation decisions
are motivated by equity will exhibit more risk averse behavior than one whose are not.
This illuminates a basic tradeoff between household equity and aggregate risk attitudes.
While we have stated the result on the domain of inequality averse and anonymous
social welfare functions, the proof makes clear that the critical property of these social
welfare functions is their recommendation to equitably divide any dollar. Any pair of
social welfare functions who recommend an equal division of a certain dollar will satisfy
the comparative static discussed here.
Finally, we note that a partial converse of our result is available. Suppose we are
given two inequality averse and anonymous social welfare functions, W and W ′. Suppose
it is known that for every list of utility functions with a common prior, UW is more risk
averse than UW ′ . Then it follows that W is more inequality averse than W
′.3
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